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SANFORD
(SOUTH ISLAND) LTD v MOYLE |
High Court, Wellington (CP3/96) 9-10 November; 10 November 1989
McGechan J
Restriction on fishing under quota — Whether reg 4B Fisheries
(South East Area Commercial Fishing) Regulations 1986 was ultra vires
the regulating power in s 89(1)(a) Fisheries Act 1983 — Whether
plaintiffs entitled to compensation under s 28D Fisheries Act 1983
The plaintiffs were commercial fishing companies. They held quota
for a variety of species, red cod and barracuda being the most relevant
to this proceeding. The plaintiffs fished for these species in the
waters off Banks Peninsula. Between December and February each year
the same waters contained concentrations of salmon retuning to spawn
in East Coast rivers. There was expert evidence that the three species
of fish tended to run together. The plaintiffs' trawlers were catching
many tonnes of salmon. Concern grew over the rate of extraction of
the salmon stock. The Fisheries (South East Area Commercial Fishing)
Regulations 1986 were passed pursuant s 89 Fisheries Act 1983 banning
trawling by vessels in excess of 23 metres and 250 kilowatts motive
power in certain areas off Banks Peninsula between December and February.
The plaintiffs sought declarations stating reg 4B of the Regulations
was ultra vires the Fisheries Act 1983 or otherwise unlawful or invalid,
or alternatively that reg 4B reduced the plaintiffs' total allowable
catch, requiring the Minister to pay compensation under s 28D of the
Fisheries Act 1983.
Held, dismissing the proceeding:
(1) It is clear, despite the elaborate and protected nature of the
quota management scheme, with its scheme for total allowable catch
and individual transferable quota, rights under the scheme by way
of ITQ are subject at least to some extent to permit conditions and
regulation. Amongst such are likely to be conditions and regulations
designed to promote conservation of marine life. The property element
inherent in the ITQ is to be given proper recognition, but subject
to that the s 89 regulation making power can go as far as is necessary
for proper marine conservation purposes.
(2) Regulation 4B did not reduce the total allowable catch. The regulation
prohibited fishing over a relatively small area, and for a limited
period only. The regulation prohibited fishing by large boats only.
These prohibitions would cause some degree of loss to the various
plaintiffs. But the imposition of the regulations would not render
the plaintiffs rights under the ITQ system ineffective. The effects
of the regulations would not be of such significance as to fall outside
the regulating authority conferred by s 89(1)(a).Whether plaintiffs
entitled to compensation under s 28D Fisheries Act 1983.
(3) As the Regulations were valid under s 89(1)(a), there was no entitlement
to compensation under s 28D Fisheries Act 1983.
Obiter, the plaintiffs faced possible losses without legal rights
to compensation under the legislation. This seemed against the spirit
of the QMS scheme and its intended commercial certainties. Nothing
in this judgment should be interpreted as endorsing that apparent
unfairness.
Statutes Referred to
Fisheries Act 1983, ss 28B, 28C, 28O, 28ZA, 28D, 89
Fisheries (South East Area Commercial Fishing) Regulations 1986, reg
4B
Proceeding
Application for declarations that reg 4B of the Fisheries (South East
Area Commercial Fishing) Regulations 1986 was ultra vires the Fisheries
Act 1983 or otherwise unlawful or invalid, or alternatively that reg
4B reduced the plaintiffs' total allowable catch, requiring the Minister
to pay compensation under s 28D of the Fisheries Act 1983.
Declarations refused; proceeding dismissed
TJ Castle and BA Scott for plaintiffs
S Kenderdine, A Kerr and TG Pearson for defendants
Reported by Reported by James Tuckey
DECISION OF McGECHAN J This is a judgment which ordinarily I would
have reserved. It is a matter of some importance, both present and
overall in relation to the integrity of the QMS scheme. However, due
to circuit requirements if it is not delivered now it will not be
delivered for more than three weeks and that delay is unacceptable.
Accordingly, I express the views which I have reached at this stage.
It will mean that I cannot canvass in any full way the evidence or
arguments which I have heard. No discourtesy is intended to either
party.
The claim is one brought by four commercial fishing companies against
the Minister of Fisheries and others, seeking certain declarations.
These refer to s 4B of the Fisheries (South East Area Commercial Fishing)
Regulations 1986 as inserted by Amendment No 3 to those regulations
passed in late 1988. The declarations sought are
(i) a declaration that regulation 4B is ultra vires the Act and otherwise
unlawful or invalid and of no legal effect, or alternatively, and
second,
(ii) that in the event that the Court determines that regulation 4B
is intra vires and otherwise valid and of full legal effect, then
a declaration pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 that
regulation 4B amounts to and has the effect of and/or is as a matter
of law a reduction in TAC in QM area 3, as envisaged by s 28D of the
Act, thereby requiring the first defendant Minister to pay compensation
to the plaintiffs in accordance with the provisions of s 28D of the
Act.
The brief facts of the matter are as follows The plaintiff commercial
fishing companies all held ITQ in respect of various commercial species
notably for present purposes red cod and barracuda in QMA3. Within
that area are the waters off Banks Peninsula. Traditionally at certain
times of the year there are good concentrations of red cod and barracuda
in those waters off Banks Peninsula. There is some dispute in the
affidavit evidence over the predictability or otherwise of the appearance,
particularly of red cod, in those waters on a regular basis, but I
am satisfied it is recognised as a good fishing ground or potential
fishing ground for both species, particularly in the summer months
from December to February and it is valued by the plaintiffs as such.
These same waters also hold prime concentrations of returning sea
run salmon over the same summer months from December to February These
comprise salmon originating both from hatcheries and from the wild.
They include three to four year old fish returning to spawn in the
East Coast rivers They are much more concentrated it appears in the
waters off Banks Peninsula at that time than in the remainder of the
Canterbury Bight area. The Banks Peninsula waters concerned are a
quite small proportion of the total QMA waters, let alone of the Canterbury
Bight waters, but have yielded some 69 to 95% of the salmon tags returned.
Inevitably, with those three concentrations of fish, plaintiffs and
others have been fishing for red cod and barracuda as they are lawfully
entitled to do under the QMS scheme and the ITA held, and for which
privilege they pay significant resource rentals, and they have trawled
up salmon. Indeed there is expert evidence that the species, salmon,
red cod and barracuda tend to run together, perhaps after the same
food stocks. Some 67% of the salmon which have been so caught have
been caught by trawlers over 23 metres in length, which, being larger,
tow a faster trawl from which the salmon are thought to be less able
to escape. Prior to the 1984 and 1985 summer no figures are known,
but since then under landing schemes allowed some tonnages of salmon
so caught have been landed. To indicate the dimension of the problem
as seen I will give some figures:
1984/1985 12.2 tonnes
1985/1986 40.5 tonnes
1986/1987 68.6 tonnes (That is said to be equivalent to 19000 fish,
amounting to one third of the fish it is believed would be returning
that summer.
1987/1988 46.0 tonnes (Amounting to some 1100 fish and a similar or
slightly higher percentage) and
1988/1989 15 tonnes
There is some evidence that some 70% of the fish so caught are of
hatchery origin.
Salmon are of both recreational and potential commercial value. They
are not presently subject to the QMS. Scientific concern has grown
as to the effects upon the salmon stock of those rates of extraction.
This has been backed by recreational fishermen who allege targeting
and a decline in recreational fishing, but some allowances must be
made for the position from which such views are expressed. A so called
Salmon By-catch Committee was constituted in 1984 and while it did
some worthwhile work, and is not criticised, it was unable ultimately
to find an agreed solution. Accordingly in mid 1988 the Minister announced,
and at the end of 1988 introduced a ban on trawling by trawlers in
excess of 23 metres and 250 kilowatts motive power off specified areas
of Banks Peninsula from mid December to the end of February. The regulations
have been passed without a terminating date, but it is understood
that they may be an experimental or temporary situation. Such cannot
yet be predicted with certainty. The effect of this ban was to inhibit
trawling operations by the plaintiffs who are owners of large trawlers
caught by the ban; in particular, any intended trawling for red cod
and barracuda. The plaintiffs have been forced to fish elsewhere and
claim large and controversial losses arising. At least on the information
before me no exact figures are possible. It may well be that the plaintiffs
over the fishing year concerned did not in the end catch quota of
red cod and barracuda. I will accept as a matter of commonsense that
it was a significant inroad into the plaintiffs red cod and barracuda
fishing practices and catch prospects. The waters concerned were a
prime spot. It was a prime time of the year; and their large boats
were banned from it. In such a situation some losses seem probable
and I cannot escape a feeling that the Ministry may have underrated
these. I will return to that.
Against that factual background, the plaintiff brings these proceedings.
The grounds upon which the declarations outlined are sought are as
follows. It is said that in coming to their decisions and promulgating
regulations the first and third defendant:
1 Acted unlawfully in that regulation 4B is ultra vires the Act as
s 89 of the Act contains no power to make such a regulation.
2 Acted contrary to law insofar as the effect of regulation 4B is
to exclude the area from a quota management area which cannot pursuant
to 28B(5) be lawfully be done by regulation.
3 Acted contrary to law insofar as the effect of regulation 4B is
and will be to reduce the TAC in QM area 3 which may only be done
by recourse to the provisions of 28D of the Amendment Act in which
event compensation is payable to the plaintiffs pursuant to its terms.
4 Acted in complete disregard of the plaintiffs rights as ITQ holders
and in disregard of the fact that the fisheries waters affected by
regulation 48 are within an area governed by a QMS as provided in
Part IIA of the Amendment Act.
Prominent in this is s 89 and the regulation making power it confers.
I turn to s 89. The defendants assert that the current regulation
is empowered under s 89(1)(a)(j) and (n). I regard paragraphs (j)
and (n) largely as incidentals. The matters tends to stand or fall
on s 89(1)(a). This reads with relevant introduction
“The Governor-General generally may from time to time by Order
in Council make regulations for all or any of the following purposes.
(a) generally regulating fishing in New Zealand and New Zealand fisheries
waters.”
There are some relevant statutory definitions. There are some difficulties
with the word “regulating”. A power to regulate does not
necessarily confer power to prohibit.
Questions of degree can be involved; but if there were nothing more
to it than that I would regard regulation 4B as empowered by s 89(1)(a).
What is done under regulation 4B is to impose a two and a half month
ban, not a full year ban, on large vessels, not on all vessels, and
in a confined area, not over all areas or over all recognised fishing
locations. What is done is for the purpose of conservation of the
salmon fishery. I would regard that limited activity as within the
phrase “regulating” fishing. However, as argument has
demonstrated there is rather more to it than that. In particular there
are questions as to the reconciliation of such a regulation making
power that the requirements of the statutory QMS scheme and whatever
rights the latter confers upon fishermen ITQ Holders. So I turn to
the statutory QMS scheme.
As an opening observation, the object behind this scheme seems clearly
enough to create a stable regime under which stocks of commercial
fish species are conserved and under which commercial fishermen have
stable and recognised rights to fish on a basis on which they can
plan and make the considerable financial commitments which this industry
requires. It is not a scheme set up to be dismantled or tinkered with
by a Minister as a matter of whim. It is not a scheme in which the
Minister is to be given any considerable leeway for adjustment by
regulation; but at the same time it is a scheme which is conservation-conscious.
It is not likely that Parliament intended to facilitate the destruction
of the marine environment, particularly where fish may have some recreational
or commercial importance. As so often happens there are some potentially
conflicting intentions which it is necessary to reconcile and to which
the Courts must strive to give effect after reconciliation.
I turn from object to provisions. Under s 28B(1) the Minister may
declare quota management areas and apply the QMS to species within
those areas. That is a significant step. This is recognised by 28B(5)
under which no such declaration may be revoked and no area may be
excluded except by Act of Parliament. It was not really necessary
to say “by Act of Parliament”. Anything in law can be
done by Act of Parliament. The words are there to illustrate that
this foundation to the scheme was not something which was to be adjusted
in itself by regulations. 28C(1) takes the next step of providing
for specification of a TAC by species within the QMA, and under 28C(2)
that TAC can be by way of separate TAC's for separate parts of the
QMA, and can be defined also by reference to methods or periods. Some
flexibility is envisaged. To date the TAC presently relevant does
not incorporate such flexibility. Under s 28(C)(6) and (7) the Minister
may by notice vary the TAC from time to time, but except under 28D
to which I will come shortly, may not reduce that TAC. Pausing, that
illustrates the certainty concept underlying this legislation. As
with the sacrosanct QMA area, fishermen are entitled to know from
the TAC what pool of fish will be available, and that it will not
be diminished over years to come subject to s 29D to which I now turn.
Section 29D does, however, allow reduction in a TAC where the species
is under stress and controls on fishing will not suffice. I paraphrase
it. This illustrates the “conservation” concept. The certainty
of the TAC must at times give way to conservation requirements if
the stock is endangered and importantly for present purposes, it admits
of a situation where controls on fish may be imposed upon a TAC for
conservation purposes. The TAC it appears is not to be inviolate in
that respect, but illustrating the other aspect of private right in
the event of such a reduction there is provision for compensation
to ITA holders determined if necessary by arbitration. I can refer
only briefly to 28E and onwards which create the ITQ scheme. ITQ are
effectively a private property right, valuable and traceable, entitling
holders to fish. They involve the holder in payment of significant
resource rentals, whether fish are caught pursuant to that right or
not. However, once again that property right is subject to the possibility
of other requirements. Under 28O(5) holders of ITQ must have a fishing
permit issued under s 63. Such permits as s 63 makes clear can be
conditional. Indirectly, fishing under an ITQ may be subject to conditions.
Likewise, and perhaps more directly, under 28ZA(2) ITQ rights to fish
are subject to stated matters. Fishing is to be in accordance with
the conditions of an appropriate fishing permit, the conditions and
limitations imposed by or under the Act, any regulations or notice
made under the Act, and any applicable fishery management plan. I
note particularly, in passing, that fishing rights under ITQ are expressed
to be subject to regulations made under the Act. It seems clear, therefore,
that despite the elaborate and protected nature of the QMS, with its
scheme for TAC and ITQ, rights under the QMS by way of ITQ are subject
at least to some extent to permit conditions and regulation. Amongst
such are likely to be conditions and regulations designed to promote
conservation of marine life. Regulations can be made for that purpose
and are to have effect. The question of course is how far they can
go. Clearly in my view, regulations cannot be made under s 89 which
goes so far as to render ineffective rights enjoyed under the QMS
by ITQ holders Parliament did not intend to give and with the one
hand, and then take away with the other. The property element inherent
in the ITQ is to be given proper recognition, but subject to that
the s 89 regulation making power can go as far as may be necessary
for proper marine conservation purposes, both of ITQ and non ITQ species.
That in my view broadly stated is the legislative scheme. It becomes,
therefore, a question of degree, or if one prefers the phrase, of
line drawing, in circumstances of particular cases, determining whether
or not the Order in Council in the processes of s 89(1)(a) “regulating”
has gone too far. In this case has regulation 4B rendered ineffective
ITQ rights of the plaintiffs? There are certain things which the regulation
does not do (and these findings in way dispose of certain of the grounds
of claim). First, they do not revoke a portion of the QMA or cut the
Banks Peninsula area out of the QMA. There is not a word said about
boundaries of the overall QMA. Formal steps would be involved and
those have not been taken. Nor in my view has it been done by effect
or by stealth through the degree of action taken, a matter to which
I turn shortly.
Second the regulation does not reduce the TAC. There is not a word
said about reduction. The TAC tonnage still is available (if it exits
at all) within the Banks Peninsula waters over the remaining nine
and a half months, but also in the remainder of QMA 3 over the standard
12 month period. Formal steps would be required. None have been taken.
What the regulation does do, might well be put under three headings
It is in this area it particularly falls for assessment. First it
prohibits fishing over a relatively small area. There are other waters
including waters in the Canterbury Bight where fishing for the species
concerned can take place. Second, it prohibits fishing over a limited
period only, between the middle of December and the end of February
in each area. That is a peak period, but there is it appears another
peak, perhaps somewhat lesser, over the April/May period which follows.
Third, it prohibits fishing by large boats only. They are those exceeding
23 metres and 250 kilowatts motive power. It is still possible to
fish in smaller boats. There is some evidence that at least one of
the plaintiffs has done so. There is a great deal of evidence before
the Court, much of it in terms of raw data and much controversial.
Sifting it as best I can, I have no doubt that these particular prohibitions
will cause some degree of loss to the various plaintiffs. This is
a significant fishing area. It has a high point in the season and
the plaintiffs will lose a chance of fishing under optimum conditions
and the results which might be hoped for from that. I cannot escape
a feeling that the Ministry may rather have underrated possible losses
which the plaintiffs may incur. These cannot be dismissed on some
hopeful basis that because they cannot be proved exactly they cannot
exist. However, on the evidence which I have, I cannot find that the
imposition of the regulations again from 15 December 1989 will render
the plaintiffs rights under the QMS system ineffective. I am not persuaded
on what happened last season that I can say with any degree of assurance
it will happen this time. After the prohibitions were permanent in
time for a full 12 months, or if it related to all boats or if it
related to all worthwhile fishing areas in QMA 3 perhaps that could
be said, or perhaps a Court could be so persuaded on quite meagre
evidence. On the present facts given the limited category of the controls
I am not persuaded the effects will be of such significance as to
fall outside the regulating authority conferred by 89(1)(a).
On that basis the claim must be, and in a moment will be, dismissed.
Before I do that I am minded to say something about compensation.
The way this result has been achieved the plaintiffs face possible
losses without legal rights to compensation under the legislation.
That does seem rather against the spirit of the QMS scheme and its
intended commercial certainties. It is exacerbated by the fact that
recreational fishermen and to some extent perhaps the tourist industry
which support them and salmon hatcheries, bear no losses but reap
all the gains, if any. Nothing in this judgment should be interpreted
as endorsing that apparent unfairness. The problem is not one which
can be dismissed by some hopeful view that there will be no loss.
Some is possible and I draw this matter to the Minister's attention.
It is a matter within his powers and responsibility, not those of
this Court. Some proper inquiry might be thought appropriate.
The formal order of the Court is that the proceedings are dismissed.
I treat this as a test case in which the plaintiffs carry a genuine
sense of grievance. There will be no order as to costs.
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